



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

may be inclined to defend on the ground that he only intended to write an introductory manual,—the work is valuable as a clear and interesting presentation of a difficult subject. It is well arranged and abounds in illustrations and literary allusions.

DAVID PHILLIPS.

Bala, North Wales.

IDEALISM AS A PRACTICAL CREED. By Henry Jones, LL.D., D.Litt. Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons, 1909. Pp. ix, 299.

This book consists of lectures delivered before the University of Sydney. Though described as lectures, they might almost as well be described as sermons,—sermons on texts from Hegel: for they are most of them concerned with the application of philosophy to life. And very eloquent sermons they are. The rhetoric is perhaps at moments a little too exuberant for a cold Anglo-Saxon taste; but their intellectual distinction is undeniable.

These lectures are intended to give the educated but not professedly philosophic hearer or reader some notion of the bearing upon life of the philosophy which their author represents. And that purpose they may be said fairly to achieve from the point of one who still finds the well-known formulæ of what may be called the Cairdian wing of the Hegelian school as satisfying and as important as they seemed to be to so many thirty or forty years ago. Those who have never been able fully to appreciate the profundity of the Hegelian common-places will perhaps at moments find themselves not so much questioning the truth of the familiar dicta, as marveling at the unction with which Professor Jones enunciates them. “We do not consider that we understand anything rightly,—nor plant, nor animal, nor man, not even the fixed strata of the earth’s crust, or the planet itself,—till we can indicate its place in a process” (p. 23). “Civilization is nothing but the process of revealing and realizing the Nature of Man, and the revelation is still going on, mysteriously and tortuously enough” (p. 34). “It is the spirit which has built up the social world that becomes in its own members aware of what it has achieved. By means of their mind, it examines itself and achieves freedom” (p. 57). “The Greeks, says Hegel, had no conscience” (p. 72). “Hence the ethical enquiries of Socrates were fatal to the Greek

State, more fatal even than those of the Sophists" (p. 77). "Thus does freedom show itself to be no merely negative thing. It is emancipation, non-interference, exclusion, independence for the individual, and great, indeed, is the price which civilization has paid to secure these for him. But it is much more. It is life *within* the State: it is the life *of* the State within its members, for his duties to himself are duties to the State" (p. 124). Most of this is undeniably true (though one may be allowed to doubt the wisdom of the sayings about Socrates), but for some of us the real difficulties both of thought and of life seem to begin just where these vaguely stimulating generalities end; and such persons will find it a relief when Professor Jones reaches more solid ground in his interesting attempt to develop the message to the modern world of Wordsworth and Browning. Then we have a chapter on the Call of the Modern Age, the net result of which is "the conviction that in these days the religious and ethical experience of reflective men has thus outgrown the definite creeds" (p. 227), though not "the deeper principles which the creeds were meant to express." The last two chapters contain the real gist of the book, at least from the point of view of the student of philosophy. They are entitled "The Answer of Idealism." Idealism of course means for Professor Jones Hegelian idealism, or rather that particular version of Hegelianism in which it may be doubted whether there is as much of the real Hegel as of the interpretation read into him by the late Master of Balliol and his school. These chapters are valuable as expressing more definitely than is sometimes done by its representatives what is the relation of this philosophical creed to the beliefs and hopes which are commonly spoken of as religious by ordinary men and women. They make it quite plain that God is for Professor Jones personally,—whatever may be the case with some who habitually employ almost the same technical phraseology,—a consciousness which is not exhausted by, though it includes, the consciousness of men and animals; that it is a will and not merely a thinker; that 'idealism' is essentially in harmony with the Christian view which regards love as the most essential feature of the divine character, and that it at all events allows us (with Professor Jones himself) to cherish the hope of personal immortality.

The last chapter of the book contains a somewhat violent defence of the unqualified Hegelian optimism, and an equally

violent attack upon its critics,—pessimists, Bradleians, and others. Professor Jones's most formidable artillery is reserved for those who find a difficulty in combining a recognition of the objective validity of our moral judgments with the assertion that everything in the universe is very good and the work of a God who is both perfectly good and, in the most crude and literal popular conception of the term, 'omnipotent.' With the utmost desire to sit at Professor Jones's feet and be instructed, I cannot find that he adds much to the controversy. Professor Jones's vindication of optimism appears to turn upon the usual assumption that, because "good implies evil," therefore the evil is not really there. "Not being objects of our experience, we must conclude that these contrasts [absolute good or absolute evil] are fictions, products of our imagination which first abstracts, and then gives a false reality to its abstractions." Then there comes the time-worn misrepresentation that those who speak of a limitation of God's power mean a limitation from the outside. "Not less evident is it that a God who is not infinite but limited is a God who is neither self-subsistent nor self-determined. If he acts, it is only under conditions which he has not called for, and he operates upon an environment over which he has not complete control. He owes his being to the causation of a prior and presumably a higher power," etc. (p. 250). Professor Jones must know perfectly well that the people whom he is criticising regard God as without beginning: how such a Being can be supposed to be 'caused,' it is difficult to understand. Professor Jones seems unable to grasp the idea of a Being who is limited by his own eternal nature, who possesses a certain definite amount of power and no more. Does he suppose, for instance, that God could commit suicide, and is not this, in a sense, a limitation? There is nothing novel about such a position. There may be difficulties in Leibniz's view of a God who makes the best of all possible but not of all imaginable worlds; but it cannot be upset by such a travesty of his position as Professor Jones's criticism implies. There may be (as Professor Jones seems to think) something peculiarly blasphemous and irreligious in such an interpretation of omnipotence as that of St. Thomas Aquinas, who explains it as a power of doing "omnia possibilia"; but such a position cannot be simply howled down by an outburst of philosophic rhetoric,—especially on the part of a writer who professes to

appeal to and be in essential harmony with the ordinary religious consciousness. The popular religious consciousness has never accepted Professor Jones's notion of a deity who includes in himself good and bad men alike, to say nothing of devils and animals ("the name 'God' which is just our name for what we deem to be in itself all in all"), or his theory that what appears to be evil in the universe is really good. Professor Jones's argument ends in an explosion of wrath against his opponents, coupled with sundry imputations upon their personal character which remind us of controversial methods now almost abandoned by the professional theologians. "It is the ignorant and the capricious spirit that finds the universe unsatisfactory" (p. 273). Such men as Eduard von Hartmann may be capricious, but are they exactly ignorant? "In recent days, by the same confusion, philosophy, or rather ordinary opinion pretending to philosophize, has in like manner been depriving God of His beneficence and power, stultifying the very name in the process" (p. 276). Professor Jones is far too angry to notice that some at least of those who question, in the popular sense, the omnipotence of God, do so just because they want to maintain his beneficence. His argument is finally clinched by the suggestion that "the critics of idealism . . . employ the categories of natural upon spiritual things. Do the windows of their souls stand in need of being cleaned?" (p. 289).

I have read this brilliant book with sincere admiration, and with a larger measure of fundamental agreement than Professor Jones himself would perhaps admit to be possible between one who does and one who does not subscribe to all the shibboleths of "Absolute Idealism." But I am compelled to say that I have occasionally wished that I could discover in it a little less heat, and a little more light.

Oxford.

H. RASHDALL.

THE HINDRANCES TO GOOD CITIZENSHIP. By James Bryce. New Haven: Yale University Press; London: Henry Frowde, 1909. Pp. 138.

The Dodge Lectures delivered at Yale by the British Ambassador to the United States form not only a useful manual of guidance for the citizen, but an acute criticism of democracy.